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Abstract
A large variety of markets, such as retail markets for gasoline or mortgage markets, are
characterized by a small number of ﬁrms offering a fairly homogenous product at virtu-
ally the same cost, while consumers, being uninformed about this cost, sequentially search
for low prices. The present paper provides a theoretical examination of this type of mar-
ket, and confronts the theory with data on retail gasoline prices. We develop a sequential
search model with incomplete information and characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which consumers follow simple reservation price strategies. Firms strategically exploit
consumers being uninformed about their production cost, and set on average higher prices
compared to the standard complete information model. Thus, consumer welfare is lower.
Using data on the gasoline retail market in Vienna (Austria), we further argue that in-
complete information is a necessary feature to explain observed gasoline prices within a
sequential search framework.
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Consider a consumer who observes the price of gasoline at a gas station. Knowing that prices
between different stations may vary considerably, the consumer must decide whether to buy
at the observed price or search for a better deal elsewhere. When making this decision, she
must estimate how much of the observed price is due to common factors affecting all gasoline
stations in a similar way, e.g. the price of crude oil, and how much is due to idiosyncratic factors
affecting the particular seller being visited. If the consumer believes that common factors
are more relevant in determining the price, she might consider searching for a cheaper gas
station not worthwhile and hence buy at the observed price. Conversely, if she believes that the
station charges a particularly high price compared to other stations, she will probably consider
it optimal to look for a better deal. A key feature of this problem is that the consumer must
take her decision under incomplete information: she is uncertain about the gas station’s input
(production) cost. Moreover, information is asymmetric, since gasoline retailers are obviously
aware of this cost; they will take this asymmetry into account when setting their prices.1
In this paper we study how information incompleteness and asymmetry affect equilibrium
in a market like the one described above. To this end, we introduce these features into the
sequential search model developed by Stahl (1989). In our model, ﬁnitely many ﬁrms sell
a homogenous product on an oligopolistic market, with all ﬁrms facing the same stochastic
production cost and being aware of its realization. Consumers have inelastic demand and en-
gage in sequential search for low prices. Unlike Stahl’s sequential search model, consumers
do not observe the ﬁrms’ production cost realization. Instead, they hold prior beliefs about the
distribution of production costs and update these beliefs as they observe prices.
In this environment, we examine the properties of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying
a reservation prices property (PBERP). In such an equilibrium, ﬁrms use mixed strategies
and sample prices from an optimal distribution, while consumers employ a (possibly non-
stationary) reservation price rule: observing a certain price, the consumer buys if the price
is below her current reservation price, and searches for a lower price otherwise. At the relevant
reservation price the consumer is indifferent between buying and searching for a better deal.
We show that, unlike in the standard search model where consumers know the ﬁrms’ pro-
duction cost, the equilibrium consumer search rule is history dependent. In particular, the reser-
vation price in each search round depends on the prices already observed in previous rounds as
consumers update beliefs about the production cost realization on the basis of their price ob-
1This feature is not only found in gasoline markets, but characterizes many environments such as insurance or
mortgage markets.
2servations. Consequently, if there exists an equilibrium where optimal search behavior in each
round is characterized by a reservation price, then this reservation price must depend on the his-
tory of price observations. Fortunately, these reservation prices satisfy an important property:
if a consumer observes her reservation price in the ﬁrst search round and, being indifferent,
continues to search, then her next rounds’ reservation prices are higher than her ﬁrst round
reservation price. This property is key to our analysis, as it implies that in a PBERP no ﬁrm
will set a price above this ﬁrst round reservation price. Importantly, it allows us to characterize
the ﬁrst round reservation price.
Using this property allows us to specify a sufﬁcient condition for the existence of a PBERP
that guarantees existence in markets with (i) a small support of the production cost distribution,
(ii) relatively large search costs, (iii) relatively many ﬁrms, or (iv) relatively few shoppers. We
argue that this condition is necessary in the sense that, if it fails to hold, one can always ﬁnd
distributions of the production cost such that a PBERP does not exist. Moreover, we provide
an example showing that even when the production cost is uniformly distributed, existence
is not guaranteed if our condition is not satisﬁed. Thus, incomplete information introduces
signiﬁcant changes to the sequential search model with respect to the existence of reservation
price equilibria.
At a more substantial level, we arriveat the following comparativestatics results. Examining
equilibrium price strategies used by ﬁrms, a ﬁrst result shows that the lower bound of the price
distribution is increasing in the cost level while its upper bound is independent of the cost
level.2 Thus, the extent of equilibrium price dispersion under incomplete information decreases
as the cost level rises, which constitutes an important difference to the complete information
setting where the extent of price dispersion is independent of the cost. Next, we highlight that
prior beliefs of consumers play an important role in shaping equilibrium price distributions.
Speciﬁcally, if consumers are more optimistic (pessimistic) that cost is low, then average prices
in the market are lower (higher).
We assess the empirical importance of incomplete information within a consumer search
framework. To this end, we consider data on gasoline prices charged in Vienna (Austria) in
the period January 2007 until June 2009. We ﬁrst argue that a search environment is indeed
appropriate to analyze the Viennese gasoline retail market as a rank reversal test on the data
suggests ﬁrms use mixed strategies, a key feature of consumer search. We then show that the
two central properties of the incomplete information model presented above are supported by
2In a PBERP, the upper bound must be equal to the ﬁrst round reservation price of consumers. Since the latter
cannot depend of the cost realization which is unknown to consumers, this property carries over to the upper
bound.
3the data: (i) the extent of price dispersion is indeed lower for high cost levels than for low ones,
(ii) prior beliefs of consumers are important in explaining price distributions as the production
cost level alone cannot explain variations in price distributions.
Studying the welfare effects of incomplete information, we show that, from an ex-ante per-
spective, consumer welfare is unambiguously lower under incomplete information and proﬁts
are unambiguously higher as compared to the environment with complete information.
This paper contributes to a large and growing literature on equilibrium consumer search
models starting from seminal contributions by Reinganum (1979), Varian (1980), Burdett and
Judd (1983), and Stahl (1989). In terms of the research question being addressed, the papers
most closely related to our paper are Benabou and Gertner (1993) and Dana (1994).3 Both
papers use, however, environments that substantially differ from the one studied in the present
paper. Importantly, they do not adopt a sequential search protocol. Benabou and Gertner ana-
lyze a duopoly market where half the consumers observe one price and the other half observes
the other price at no cost. The only decision consumers have to make is whether to also ob-
serve the price of the ﬁrm they have not yet observed at a search cost. Dana considers a model
with two types of consumers (informed and uninformed) where the uninformed consumers are
engaged in what he calls newspaper search. These consumers get a ﬁrst price quote for free
and, on the basis of this price, they decide whether or not to become fully informed about all
prices by paying a search cost. Papers by Fershtman and Fishman (1992) and Fishman (1996)
and the recent contributions by Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2008) use frameworks simi-
lar to Dana (1994), but extend them to a dynamic setting. In such environments, these papers
study asymmetric price adjustment to cost shocks, the so-called rockets-and-feathers pattern.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to introduce incomplete information into a
sequential consumer search model.
In a broader sense the current paper is related to recent work which elaborates on the role of
information gathering and information processing in consumer search.4 This literature focuses
on obfuscation (Ellison and Wolitzky (2009), Ellison and Ellison (2009)), boundedly rational
agents (see, e.g., Spiegler (2006)), or information gatekeepers on the internet (see, e.g., Baye
and Morgan (2001)). Another strand of the literature makes progress on the policy implications
of the consumer search literature on consumer protection policies (see, e.g., Armstrong, Vick-
ers, and Zhou (2009)) or on the empirical implementation of consumer search models (see, e.g.,
3Earlier work by Diamond (1971) and Rothschild (1974) has analyzed optimal search behavior in a world
where the price distribution is unknown, but exogenously given. Recently, Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009)
uncover some formal relations between optimal stopping rules in the consumer search literature and the problem
of ensuring monotone allocation rules in dynamic allocation problems.
4Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) surveys a wide range of consumer search models .
4Lach (2007), Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) and Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2008)).
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we brieﬂy
discuss a standard sequential search model with completely informed consumers, establishing
a theoretical benchmark for comparison of our incomplete information model. In Section 3
we develop our model with incompletely informed consumers, deﬁne a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium and characterize its properties. In Section 4 we examine the effects of incomplete
information on consumer and producer welfare. In Section 5, we assess its empirical relevance
by confronting the model with data on retail gasoline prices. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude
and discuss directions for future research. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Sequential search with completely informed consumers
We start our analysis by describing a sequential search model with completely informed con-
sumers along the lines of Stahl (1989). This model will, at a later stage, serve as our benchmark
to assess the implications of incomplete (asymmetric) information within the sequential search
framework. Essentially, we modify Stahl’s model along only two dimensions. First, to sim-
plify the analysis we consider a model of inelastic demand as in Janssen, Moraga-Gonzalez,
and Wildenbeest (2005). Second, we do not normalize marginal costs to zero; solving the
model for positive marginal costs is inevitable for our purposes, because later on we want to
analyze and compare situations under different marginal cost levels.
2.1 Model
We consider an oligopolistic market where N ﬁrms sell a homogenous good and compete in
prices. Each ﬁrm n 2 f1;:::;Ng faces the same production technology and the same marginal
production cost, denoted by c. Without loss of generality, we normalize ﬁxed costs to zero.
Each ﬁrms’ objective is to maximize proﬁts, taking the prices charged by other ﬁrms and the
consumers’ behavior as given.
On the demand side of the market we have a continuum of consumers with identical pref-
erences. Each consumer j 2 [0;1] has inelastic demand normalized to one unit, and holds the
same constant evaluation v > 0 for the good. Observing a price below v, consumers will thus
either buy one unit of the good or search for a lower price. In the latter case, they have to pay a
search cost s to obtain one additional price quote, i.e. search is sequential. A fraction l 2 [0;1]
of consumers, the shoppers, have zero search cost. These consumers sample all prices and
buy at the lowest price. The remaining fraction of 1¡l consumers – the non-shoppers – have
5positive search costs s > 0. These consumers face a non-trivial problem when searching for
low prices, as they have to trade off the search cost with the (expected) beneﬁt from search.
Consumers can always come back to previously visited ﬁrms incurring no additional cost, i.e.
we are considering a model of costless recall.5 We assume that v is large relative to c and s so
that v is not binding. In this section consumers are informed about the cost realization c.
2.2 Equilibrium
In this model, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium where consumer behavior
satisﬁes a reservation price property. Moreover, Kohn and Shavell (1974) and Stahl (1989)
argue that the reservation prices are stationary. That is, the consumers’ reservation prices are
independent from the history of price observations and the number of ﬁrms left to be sampled
(provided there is still at least one ﬁrm left) and can therefore simply be denoted by rk(c).6
To characterize this equilibrium it is useful to introduce some more notation: we denote, for
a given production cost c, the distribution of prices charged by ﬁrms by Fk(pjc), its density by
fk(pjc), and the lower- and upper- bound of its support by pk(c) and by ¯ pk(c), respectively.
It is well-known that the presence of both shoppers and non–shoppers, l 2 (0;1), implies
that there does not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies and that there are no mass points in
the equilibrium price distribution. The main reason behind this observation is that ﬁrms face
a tradeoff between setting low prices to cater to the shoppers and setting high prices to extract
proﬁts from the non–shoppers. Also, the upper bound of the equilibrium price distribution must
satisfy ¯ pk(c) = rk(c), i.e. in a symmetric equilibrium no ﬁrm will set a price higher than the
reservation price rk(c). Given these two observations, the equilibrium price distribution can be
characterized by



























with support on [pk(c); ¯ pk(c)] with pk(c) = lN
lN+1¡lc+ 1¡l
lN+1¡l ¯ pk(c) and ¯ pk(c) = rk(c).
5Janssen and Parakhonyak (2007) analyze the case where this assumption is replaced by costly recall.
6We use the superscript k to indicate variables and parameters of the model with completely informed con-
sumers who know the production cost realization c.
6The proof follows essentially Stahl (1989). For the reader’s convenience we nevertheless report
it in the appendix.
Having characterized the Nash equilibrium price distribution conditional on the reservation
price rk(c), we turn to optimal consumer behavior. Given a distribution of prices Fk(pjc) and






Using the result that the equilibrium price distribution satisﬁes ¯ pk(c) = rk(c), this condition
boils down to
rk(c) = s+Ek(pjc): (3)
(Janssen, Pichler, and Weidenholzer, 2009) show that the expected price conditional on the cost
realization c, Ek(pjc), can be computed as described in the following lemma:










1¡l zN¡1dz 2 [0;1).
Note that (3) and (4) imply the following simple expression for the reservation price,




The reservation price is thus a constant markup over the cost, with the size of the markup
being determined by the model’s parameters. Note further that, by Proposition 2.1, pk(c) is a
weighted average of c and rk(c). Consequently, it immediately follows that, provided s > 0,
the lower bound satisﬁes pk(c) > c. Thus ﬁrms make positive proﬁts when charging prices
according to Fk(pjc): Furthermore, the following result obtains:
Corollary 2.1 The equilibrium price spread, i.e. the difference between the upper bound and
the lower bound of the price distribution, is independent of the realized cost level c and given
by






The proof follows from (5) and proposition 2.1. What is interesting about Proposition 2.1 is
that a change in c leads to a one to one shift in the price distribution, leaving the extent of price
dispersion unaffected. This testable implication we will confront with actual data later on.
7Note at this stage that, conditional on the cost c, the average price paid by a fraction 1¡l
of consumers, i.e. the non-shoppers, is equal to Ek(pjc) as given in (4). This is, however, not
the (average) price paid by the l shoppers who observe all prices in the market and buy at the
cheapest ﬁrm. This latter price is given by Ek(p`jc), with p` = minfp1;p2;:::;pNg. As ﬁrms
choose prices randomly and independent from each other, it follows that the distribution of p`
is given by
Fk
l (p`jc) = 1¡[1¡Fk(pjc)]N: (7)
The techniques used to prove Lemma 2.1 provided in Janssen, Pichler, and Weidenholzer
(2009) can then be applied to establish that:
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Ek(p`jc)dc. These expected prices will later on be important to assess consumer welfare in
the economy, as v¡Ek(p`) is the expected equilibrium consumer surplus attained by shoppers
whereas v¡Ek(p) is expected equilibrium surplus of the 1¡l non-shoppers.7 Formally, we
obtain:












The proof follows trivially from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2. Note that both ex-ante expected prices
take the form of a markup over the ex-ante expected cost, with the size of the respective markup
being determined by the parameters l, N, and s, respectively.
3 Sequential search with incompletely informed consumers
We now turn to the analysis of the incomplete information model and modify the model pre-
sented in Section 2 by postulating that consumers are uninformed about the ﬁrms’ production
7We will compute expected consumer surplus in the very beginning of the game, i.e. before the cost level c is
drawn from g(c).
8cost. Let nature randomly draw c from a continuous distribution g(c) with compact support
on [c; ¯ c]. Consumers do not know the cost realization and they all hold the same prior beliefs
ˆ g about the production cost distribution and update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule as
they observe prices. We ﬁrst analyze the case where these beliefs are correct in the sense that ˆ g
equals the actual cost distribution g.
3.1 On out-of-equilibrium beliefs
Inthemodelwithincompletelyinformedconsumers, theexactspeciﬁcationofout-of-equilibrium
beliefs plays an important role in determining reservation prices. To see this point, assume that
consumers hold out-of-equilibrium beliefs that are such that, if a price above their reservation
price is observed, they think that the lowest cost level has been realized with probability one
and therefore continue to search. In such a case, in equilibrium no ﬁrm would set a price above
the reservation price (more details will be given shortly) and therefore such a price observation
is clearly an out-of-equilibrium event. Note that under these particular beliefs, one can sup-
port a (ﬁrst round) “reservation price” with the property that a consumer who observes it will
strictly prefer to buy instead of actually being indifferent between buying and searching for a
lower price. In a complete information setting, this could never be a reservation price as con-
sumers would then also be willing to buy at a slightly higher price. However, in the incomplete
information case under these particular out-of-equilibrium beliefs, a consumer would prefer to
search for lower prices thinking that the lowest cost level has been realized and thus that prices
should be low. Consequently, there would be a discontinuity in the willingness of consumers
to buy around this “reservation price”.
However, we think that such a discontinuity is difﬁcult to defend in a consumer search model
and we certainly do not want the comparison between the complete and incomplete information
settings to depend on the arbitrary choice of out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We therefore insist that,
if at a reservation price consumers strictly prefer to buy, out-of-equilibrium beliefs should be
such that consumers also should buy at a slightly higher price. This effectively deﬁnes the ﬁrst
round reservation price as the price at which the consumer is indifferent between buying and
continuing to search, in a way similar to the familiar complete information search model. In
the following, we limit attention to equilibria satisfying such a reservation prices property.
3.2 Equilibria with reservation prices property
Westart byprovidingaformal deﬁnition ofwhat wemean by equilibriasatisfying areservation
prices property. This requires ﬁrst to introduce some more notation. In particular, we denote by
9rt(p1;:::;pt¡1) the reservation price of a consumer in search round t who has observed prices
p1;:::;pt¡1 in the t ¡1 previous search rounds. Note that unlike the complete information
model, any reservation price rt(p1;:::;pt¡1) held by consumers has to be independent of the
production cost and that the reservation price r1 in the ﬁrst round is not conditional on any
price observation, and we write r1 = r. We have: 8
Deﬁnition 3.1 AperfectBayesianequilibriumsatisfyingareservationpricesproperty(PBERP)
is characterized by:
1) each ﬁrm n 2 f1;:::;Ng uses a price strategy that maximizes its (expected) proﬁt, given
the competing ﬁrms’ price strategies and the search behavior of consumers;
2) given the (possibly degenerate) distribution of prices, consumers search optimally; more-
over, optimal consumer search is of the following form:
i) after observing pt =rt(p1;:::;pt¡1) in roundt and p1;:::;pt¡1 in previous rounds,
the consumer is indifferent between buying and continuing to search;
ii) after observing any pt < rt(p1;:::;pt¡1) in round t and p1;:::;pt¡1 in previous
rounds, the consumer buys.
In what follows, we concentrate on the characterization of this type of equilibrium and deter-
mine conditions for existence.
3.3 Properties of PBERP
We ﬁrst examine the properties of a PBERP, assuming that such an equilibrium exists. In the
next subsection, we consider the existence question. A ﬁrst observation is that in a PBERP, the
upper bound of the price distribution has to be equal to the reservation price of consumers in
the very ﬁrst search round, i.e. ¯ p(c) = ¯ p = r for all c 2 [c; ¯ c]. Suppose this was not the case
and that for some c, ¯ p(c) > r. If a ﬁrm charges ¯ p(c), it will not sell to shoppers in any PBERP,
as ¯ p(c) does not have positive probability and therefore shoppers observe lower prices with
probability one. Furthermore, a ﬁrm setting ¯ p(c) will not sell to non-shoppers either, as these
consumers will continue to search after observing p in the ﬁrst search round, and will then ﬁnd
a lower price in a subsequent search round with probability one. On the other hand, it can also
not be the case that for some c, ¯ p(c) < r since ﬁrms could proﬁtably deviate to a price equal to
r because non-shoppers would continue to buy.
8This deﬁnition is an adaptation of the reservation price equilibrium deﬁned by Dana (1994) to the case of
sequential search.
10Under asymmetric information ﬁrms face virtually the same maximization problem as in the
complete information benchmark. The only major difference is that upper bound of the price
distribution is now constant at ¯ p = r for all realizations of the cost c. Formally:



























with support on [p(c); ¯ p] with p(c) = lN
lN+1¡lc+ 1¡l
lN+1¡l ¯ p and ¯ p = r.
The proof is omitted, as it is a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 2.1. Inspec-
tion of (11) reveals that F(pjc) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates (FOSD) F(pjc0) whenever
c>c0. Furthermore, we have that p(c) is increasing in c, implying that consumers who observe
prices below p(c) can rule out certain (high) cost realizations. Finally, we can characterize
E(pjc) as in Janssen, Pichler, and Weidenholzer (2009)
E(pjc) = (1¡a)c+a ¯ p: (13)
Using a numerical example, Figure 1 visualizes all these observations by plotting the price
distributions F(pjc) for different realizations of the production cost c. This ﬁgure points to the
fact that the price spread is decreasing in c as stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1 If consumers are uninformed about the ﬁrms’ cost realization, the price spread
in a PBERP is equal to




and therefore is decreasing in the cost level c.
Corollary 3.1 establishes a sharp contrast to the complete information model in which the price
spread is independent of the realized cost level.
Let us now turn the focus on consumers’ search behavior. Assuming consumers have correct
prior beliefs about the production cost, ˆ g(c) = g(c), and use Bayesian updating after observing
a price p, let d(cjp) be the (posterior) probability density function of the production cost c





11Figure 1: Price distributions

























Parameters: N = 3, s = 0:01, l = 0:01, c »U(0;1)
It remains to specify consumers’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs, i.e. beliefs on the cost level for
price observations not in the support of the equilibrium price distribution. As argued above, we
want to avoid out-of-equilibrium beliefs that create a discontinuity in the willingness of con-
sumers to buy around the reservation price. To this end, we assume that for a price observation
above the upper bound of the price distribution consumers hold the same beliefs on the cost
level as if they had observed the upper bound, i.e. d(cjp) = d(cj ¯ p) for p > ¯ p.9
In the following, we derive several lemmas that will prove useful to examine the properties
of PBERP. First, we identify an important feature of Bayesian updating in our framework that
plays a key role in our main results: a consumer who has observed a price p 2 [p(c); ¯ p] will
put more probability mass on higher realization of the production cost and less mass on lower
realizations of the production cost than under the prior distribution g(c).
Lemma 3.1 For any p 2 [p(c); ¯ p], the posterior distribution of cost levels d(cjp) ﬁrst order
stochastically dominates the prior distribution g(c).
Lemma 3.1 implies that non-shoppers who have observed any p 2 [p(c); ¯ p] expect a higher








9As at prices below the lower bound of the price distribution in the lowest cost scenario consumers buy regard-
less of their beliefs on the realized cost level, beliefs in these states are irrelevant.
12Moreover, we ﬁnd that the higher the price observed in the interval p 2 [p(c); ¯ p], the more
optimistic the consumer is about the possibility of ﬁnding low prices if she continues searching.
Formally,






> 0 if c < ˆ c
= 0 if c = ˆ c
< 0 if c > ˆ c:
Consequently, forall p;p0 2[p(c); ¯ p]with p0 > p, theposteriordistributionofcostlevelsd(cjp)
FOSD d(cjp0).
Lemma 3.2 appears puzzling at ﬁrst sight. However, the intuition behind it is readily seen: in
the interval [p(c); ¯ p], the ratio of densities f(pjc0)=f(pjc) is increasing in p for any pair c;c0
with c0 <c. This implies that higher prices in [p(c); ¯ p] are relatively more likely under low costs
than under high costs, which in turn explains why higher price observations in p2[p(c); ¯ p] lead
the consumer to become more optimistic about the cost realization.
We now move on to the characterization of reservation prices under incomplete information.
Recall that in the complete information model, the reservation price is deﬁned as the price
at which the consumer is indifferent between buying now and continuing to search. In the










However, under incomplete information because of Bayesian updating reservation prices are
notstationaryanddodependentonthesearchhistory. Theargumentsusedabovemayhencenot
be valid and it is not obvious that the ﬁrst round reservation price should satisfy (15). In what
follows, we however prove that (15) still provides a proper characterization of the reservation
price. The intuition is the following: if a consumer in search round one observes the round
one reservation price and decides to continue searching, she will ﬁnd a price strictly below the
round two reservation price with probability one in the next round and thus buys in round two.
Lemma 3.3 establishes this result.
Lemma 3.3 In any PBERP, after observing the upper bound of the price distribution in the ﬁrst
search round, a consumer’s reservation price in the second search round satisﬁes r2(r) > r:
13It follows that there does not exist a PBERP where consumers follow a stationary reservation
price search rule. This is an important difference with the complete information model. Using
equation (13) and r = ¯ p gives us
















c d(cj ¯ p)dc = 1 and
R ¯ c
c cd(cj ¯ p)dc = E(cj ¯ p), we further have that the reservation price is
implicitly deﬁned by




Substituting (16) into (13), we arrive at the following result:
Proposition 3.2 In any PBERP the conditionally expected prices E(pjc) and E(p`jc) in a








s+a[E(cj ¯ p)¡c]: (18)
From Proposition 3.2 the following result immediately follows:









s+a[E(cj ¯ p)¡E(c)]: (20)
3.4 Existence of PBERP
Having established some properties any PBERP should satisfy, we now move to the existence
question. Note that we have so far implicitly assumed that non-shoppers would like to buy at all
prices below r. While this is straightforward to establish in the framework with complete in-
formation, it is not obvious under incomplete information since consumers update their beliefs
about the true cost as they observe prices. In particular, after observing a price p < p(c) a con-
sumer may suddenly think that the cost is very low and thus may decide to continue searching.
Moreover, we need to verify that for all cost realizations ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to set the prices
implicitly speciﬁed above. In particular, we need that p(c) > c for all values of c: Again, un-
der asymmetric information this condition is not automatically satisﬁed as the reservation price
(and thereby the upper bound of the price distribution) is independent of the cost realization.











then a unique PBERP exists.
The proof is based on the following considerations. We ﬁrst show that observing a price p
with p(c) < p < r, an uninformed consumer prefers to buy instead of continuing to search and
buy in a later round. Note that at these prices, consumers assign positive density to any cost
realization c and by Lemma 3.1 become more pessimistic about the possibility of ﬁnding lower
prices when continuing to search. We then examine lower price observations p0 < p(c), where
consumers can rule out certain high cost realizations. For a PBERP to exist, consumers must
still ﬁnd it optimal to buy at such prices. This, in turn, requires that consumers do not infer
from observing a price p0 < p(c) that the cost is low enough so that continued search pays off.
To rule out this case, we exploit the idea that a consumer who ﬁnds it optimal to buy at a price
p0 if he knows the cost realization is c, i.e. p0 · rk(c), certainly has to ﬁnd it optimal to buy
in the unknown cost case at the same price. Consequently, by imposing p(¯ c) · rk(c) we can
guarantee that a consumer will ﬁnd it optimal to buy at all price observations smaller than the
reservation price r. This condition translates into inequality (21) characterizing the existence
of a PBERP. Furthermore, inequality (21) also is sufﬁcient to ensure that ﬁrms will set prices
as speciﬁed above, i.e. p(c) > c holds for all c 2 [c; ¯ c].
It is interesting to see when the condition in Proposition 3.3 holds. Clearly, this is the case
when the support of the cost distribution ¯ c¡c is small or s is large. More interestingly, it is also
the case when N is large enough (for any given values of the other parameters). To see this,
note that both lN
lN+1¡l and a approach one as N approaches inﬁnity; the RHS of inequality
(21) therefore approaches inﬁnity as well. Finally, note that when c · c+Ns, a PBERP exists




























15For l close to 0, the right hand side of our inequality is thus approximately equal to c+Ns.
We summarize our ﬁndings regarding the existence of PBERP in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.3 A PBERP exists in environments with
(i) a sufﬁciently small support of the cost distribution, ¯ c¡c, and/or
(ii) sufﬁciently large search costs s, and/or
(iii) sufﬁciently many ﬁrms N, and/or
(iv) a sufﬁciently small fraction of shoppers l, provided that c · c+Ns holds.
For general functions g(c) the condition established in Proposition 3.3 is “almost necessary”
in the following sense. If p(¯ c) > rk(c); then one can construct a density function of the cost
parameter, g(c), that is concentrated on values close to the two extremes c and ¯ c (see Figure
2) such that, after observing a price smaller than p(¯ c), consumers suddenly consider it ex-
tremely likely that the cost is close to c. In particular, if a price observation p is in the interval
(rk(c);p(¯ c)) consumers will then prefer to search.




One may then wonder whether, if we restrict the prior cost distribution, existence of a
PBERP may always be guaranteed. Considering a uniform distribution of production costs,
the next example demonstrates that this is not the case. Figure 3 displays the net beneﬁts of
search in a duopoly market with search costs equal to s = 0:00675, a shopper-share equal to
l = 0:025, and production costs drawn from the uniform distributionU(0;1). As can easily be
seen, for this parameter constellation no PBERP exists: the consumer does not prefer to buy
16Figure 3: Net beneﬁts of search












Parameters: N = 2, s = 0:00675, l = 0:025, c »U(0;1)
for all prices below the potential reservation price deﬁned by equation (16).10 While for prices
between r = 1:0260 and p(¯ c) = 1:0248 the consumer strictly prefers to buy, when observing
prices slightly below p(¯ c), the net beneﬁts of search are increasing rapidly. Indeed, the net
search beneﬁts become positive for an interval of prices a bit below p(¯ c). The reason is that
when the consumer observes prices just below p(¯ c), she infers that the expected production
cost is relatively low and so is the expected price. When she would observe even lower prices,
the search beneﬁts increase rapidly and it becomes proﬁtable not to buy at the observed price
but to search for a lower price, even though the consumer would have bought had she observed
a slightly higher price.
In case a PBERP does not exist, it is important to know what type of equilibrium does exist.
Unfortunately, it turns out this is a very difﬁcult issue to solve. One thing we can show is that
allowing for more general reservation prices does not overcome the non-existence problem.
Generally, a reservation price strategy is a strategy according to which consumers buy if, and
only if, they observe a price at or below a certain cut-off price. The next results says that there
are parameter values for which equilibria where consumers follow such strategies do not exist.
Proposition 3.4 If s is relatively small or c¡c is relatively large and g(c) has a relatively high
probability mass close to c, then an equilibrium where consumers follow a reservation price
10Rothschild (1974) already observed that if consumers sample from an unknown distribution, it may happen
that they prefer to buy at high prices, whereas they continue to search (and do not buy) at lower prices. Rothschild
focuses, however, on the consumer search problem for a given (but unknown) price distribution. We show that
these considerations actually are relevant and do arise in consumer search models where ﬁrms are strategically
choosing prices.
17strategy does not exist.
Together with the obvious fact that there cannot be a hole in the prices at which consumers
decide to buy, Proposition 3.4 implies that for some parameter values consumers have to follow
a mixed strategy in equilibrium. We leave it for further research to fully characterize these
equilibria.
3.5 Distorted Priors
So far we have postulated that consumers hold optimal priors about the cost distribution g(c),
i.e. consumers effectively know the distribution from which the production cost is drawn. We
have shown that these prior beliefs are an important determinant of prices in equilibrium, as
they affect the reservation price of consumers (and thus equilibrium price distributions).
In this section, we relax the assumption that prior beliefs are necessarily correct and analyze
the effects of distorted priors on the prices charged by ﬁrms. In particular, we examine an
equilibrium where consumers’ prior beliefs are characterized by
ˆ g(c) = h(c)g(c);
where h(c) is a function deﬁned on [c; ¯ c] which is either monotonically increasing in c or
monotonically decreasing; the ﬁrst case implies that consumers overestimate the cost level,
while the latter case implies that consumers underestimate it.11 With distorted priors we arrive
at the following results.
Proposition 3.5 When h is monotonically increasing, i.e. consumers have prior beliefs which
are distorted towards higher cost levels, the average price and the average proﬁt are higher as
in the scenario where consumers hold optimal prior beliefs g. Conversely, when h is monoton-
ically decreasing, the average price and the average proﬁt are lower.
This proposition shows a further important aspect of incomplete information within a search
framework: consumers’ reservation prices are affected by their priors. Consequently, the price
setting behavior of ﬁrms is affected in the direction in which beliefs are distorted.
11Note that if h(c) is increasing in c then ˆ g(c) FOSD g(c) and if h(c) is decreasing g(c) FOSD ˆ g(c). In addition,
note that ﬁrst order stochastic dominance per se does not imply monotonicity of h(c). In this sense our concept is
stronger than FOSD.
184 The welfare implications of incomplete information
The examination of the welfare effects of incomplete information effectively boils down to a
comparison of (i) the ex–ante expected price, (ii) the ex–ante expected lowest price, and (iii)
the ex–ante expected ﬁrm proﬁt in the two scenarios. This allows us, in turn, to assess the
welfare implications for all three types of agents in the economy, i.e. non-shoppers, shoppers,
and ﬁrms.
Assuming that a PBERP exists, and restricting attention to the case where consumer priors
are again optimal, we ﬁnd that:
Proposition 4.1 In the PBERP of the sequential search model with incomplete information,
² the ex-ante expected price paid by non-shoppers, E(p),
² the ex-ante expected price paid by shoppers, E(p`), and
² the ex-ante expected proﬁt made by ﬁrms,
are higher than in the complete information model. Consequently, consumer surplus is lower
and producer surplus is higher.
Proposition 4.1 illustrates that consumer welfare is higher when the consumers are informed
about the ﬁrms’ production cost suggesting that policy interventions inducing observability of
production cost beneﬁt consumers.
Finally, we have:
Proposition 4.2 The conditionally expected proﬁts of ﬁrms are decreasing in the cost level c
when consumers are uninformed about the cost realization, whereas these proﬁts are indepen-
dent of c when consumers are perfectly informed. In particular, conditionally expected proﬁts
under incomplete information are higher (lower) for low (high) cost realizations compared to
when consumers are perfectly informed.
This proposition highlights a further interesting and empirically testable difference between the
complete and incomplete sequential consumer search frameworks.
5 The empirical relevance of asymmetric information: an
example
Having examined the theoretical implications of incomplete information within a sequential
consumer search framework, we next assess its empirical relevance. To this end, we confront
19the model with data on the retail gasoline market in Vienna, Austria. Speciﬁcally, we exam-
ine the properties of prices for Euro-super 95 gasoline (aka regular unleaded) together with a
measure of its production cost based on the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp spot market price.
Note that it is not our goal to provide a full econometric analysis of the retail market for gaso-
line products.12 Rather we want to provide some evidence that incomplete information and
consumer search play an important role in shaping price distributions in the retail gasoline
market.
Before proceeding to the empirical results, we give a detailed description of our data set
and argue that the gasoline retail market in Vienna can be accurately described with a search
framework.
5.1 Data description
Our ﬁrst data set includes prices for Euro-super 95 gasoline at 231 stations in Vienna over the
time period January 2007 until June 2009. In total, the sample contains 88.176 price observa-
tions. 13
Our second data set includes a proxy for retailers’ production costs. The measure is based
ontheDailyAmsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp10ppmConventionalGasolineRegularSpotPrice
series, which is available from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.14 We convert the
original data into Euro per litre using a gallon-to-litre ratio of 3.78541178 together with the
USD-EUR exchange rates obtained from the European Central Bank.15 Then we add Austrian
indirect taxes and the value added tax following the guidelines provided in the Oil Bulletin of
the European Commission.16 To have cost data available on a daily basis, we use closing prices
on Fridays to construct data for the weekends. The resulting series serves as our proxy for
retailers’ production cost.
Mostofourempiricalanalysiswillbebasedontheminimum, theaverage, andthemaximum
price observed in the market on a particular day. Note that our price data set contains many
12There are several extensive empirical analyses of gasoline markets available in the economics literature. See,
among others, Hastings (2004), Lewis (2004, 2008), Hosken, McMillan, and Taylor (2008), Chandra and Tappata
(2008), and Lach and Moraga-González (2009) for recent examples.
13The data were originally collected by the Austrian Automobile, Motorcycle- and Touring Club (ÖAMTC),
who uses the data primarily to provide daily information about cheap gasoline stations on its website
http://www.oeamtc.at. The website does not contain the time series data. Access to the full price data set is
restricted, but the summary time series are available for download on the authors’ websites.
14Available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/ru-10pp-ara5d.htm
15Available at http://www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/index.en.html
16Available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/bulletin en.htm
20Figure 4: Euro-super 95 prices and production costs













missing values, which creates some difﬁculties as it introduces high frequency variability in the
minimum and maximum series. To remove this variability, we smooth the minimum, mean,
and maximum series using a weekly moving average ﬁlter. For consistency, we employ the
same ﬁlter on the production cost. Figure 4 illustrates the smoothed time series.
5.2 Is a consumer search model appropriate?
Before examining the role of incomplete information in shaping price distributions, we provide
evidence that the gasoline retail market in Vienna can indeed be well characterized by a con-
sumer search framework. To this end, we examine the properties of retail price dispersion over
time.17
Visual inspection of Figure 4 reveals that there is indeed a signiﬁcant extent of price disper-
sion: the maximum price and the minimum price differ by close to 12 Euro Cent on average.
The size of dispersion becomes even more apparent when expressed in terms of the margin
charged by retailers: while the minimum margin is on average 6 Cent, the maximum margin is
on average three times as high at 18 Euro Cent per liter.
Price dispersion itself, however, is not a piece of hard evidence in favor of a costly con-
sumer search framework, as it arises likewise in models of product differentiation. Although
17Note that throughout our analysis we will treat the whole city of Vienna as a single market for gasoline. This
may be viewed as somewhat unrealistic, since not all stations compete directly with each other, but is assumed for
the sake of simplicity.
21Euro-super 95 gasoline is a fairly homogenous product, differences in retail prices may be due
to differences in the retailers’ attributes, such as brand type or location, among other things.
Importantly, however, the dynamic properties of price dispersion are different for product dif-
ferentiation models than for consumer search models. Under product differentiation, ﬁrms will
set prices according to pure strategies. As a consequence, the relative price rankings of any
pair of retailers should be roughly constant over time, provided that the characteristics of the
products remain constant over time (which we think is plausible to assume in the present appli-
cation). In search models, ﬁrms will however use mixed strategies, i.e. sample prices from an
optimal distribution. Consequently, relative price rankings will not be constant over time: any
retailer is expected to offer relatively low prices in some periods of time while setting relatively
high prices in other periods. Using the terminology of Chandra and Tappata (2008), consumer
search models display temporal price dispersion.
To test whether temporal price dispersion is present in our data, we follow the approach
suggested by Chandra and Tappata and examine the price rankings of different gasoline stations
over time. In particular, we analyze the rank reversal statistics for each pair (i; j) of stations in
our sample. Labelling stations such that pit > pjt is observed most of the time, where pit and
pjt denote the prices of stations i and j at time t, respectively, the rank reversal statistic gives








I is an indicator function and Tij gives the number of days in the sample on which price obser-
vations for both stations are available. Note that by construction rij 2 [0;0:5]. Rank reversals
strictly greater than zero can be interpreted as evidence of temporal price dispersion, and thus
that dispersion is due to consumer search rather than product differentiation.
Figure 5 presents a histogram of rank reversals for all pairs of stations in Vienna. Note
further that 93% of station pairs feature a rank reversal statistic larger than zero, and that rank
reversals are far from zero on average (¯ r = 0:2445).18 From this evidence we conclude that
a consumer search framework is indeed well suited to describe the retail gasoline market in
Vienna.
18This general result is robust to modiﬁcations to the computation of rank reversals, such as including only pairs
for which Tij is large, or counting as a rank reversal only cases where prices differ noticeably.
22Figure 5: Rank reversals
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5.3 The role of incomplete information
Having argued that a search model is appropriate to analyze the retail gasoline market in Vi-
enna, we proceed to discuss the role of incomplete information. In particular, we provide two
pieces of empirical evidence that suggest the relevance of incomplete information in shaping
price distributions.
Equilibrium price dispersion
We ﬁrst focus again on the properties of equilibrium price dispersion. In particular, we examine
whether the extent of dispersion as measured by the difference between the upper bound and
the lower bound of the price distribution, i.e. the price spread, varies with the production cost
level. Recall that in the complete information model, the price spread is independent of the
cost level, while it is decreasing in c in the incomplete information framework (see Proposition
3.1). We exploit this difference to examine which of the two models is more in line with the
gasoline price data.
To this end, we estimate by OLS the linear model
SPREADt = q0+qcMCt: (22)
The variable SPREADt serves as our proxy for the extent of price dispersion. It gives the dif-
ference between the observed maximum and the minimum price at date t, i.e. SPREADt =
MAXPt ¡MINPt with MAXPt and MINPt denoting the maximum and minimum price, respec-
tively; by MCt we denote the proxy for (marginal) production costs.19
19To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we do not control for product heterogeneity across retailers. The
23The complete information framework suggests the parameter qc in (22) be zero, whereas
it should be negative according to the incomplete information model. Table 1 summarizes the
results of our regression and shows that qc is indeed signiﬁcantly below zero, supporting the
framework with incomplete information rather than complete information.
Table 1: Regression results
Coefﬁcient Point Est. 95% CI
q0 0.1563 [ 0.1440, 0.1687]
qc -0.0377 [-0.0497,-0.0257]
R2 0.0415
Note that in both the incomplete and the complete information model, changes in the price
spread can result from changes in the model parameters N, s, and l. Variations in the spread
over time might thus as well be due to variations in these parameters. Whereas it is easy to
show that the number of ﬁrms N has been virtually constant over our sample period, this is
more difﬁcult to argue for the search cost, s, and the fraction of informed consumers, l, since
these are not directly observable in the data. However, we believe it is reasonable to assume
that s and l are not too volatile and, in particular, that both are not correlated with the evolution
of the production cost level. Hence, it is safe to conclude from the results in Table 1 that the
data suggest an important role for incomplete information in shaping price distributions.
We do not claim that the model from Section 3 is a proper device to study pricing behav-
ior in the retail gasoline market. Importantly, our model is static while gasoline pricing is
clearly a dynamic problem. Consequently, to have a full theoretical characterization of pricing
behavior in gasoline markets one would need to work with a dynamic extension of the incom-
plete information model that would have to incorporate, among other things, features such as
forward-looking agents and a role for reputation building. Constructing such a model is clearly
not an easy exercise and goes beyond the scope of the present analysis.
Price distributions and the role of prior beliefs
One issue where dynamics are important is in determining consumers’ prior beliefs about the
underlying cost for the gasoline retailers. In the static theory model of Section 3, we have
that for a constant prior the upper bound of the equilibrium price distribution is a constant.
rank reversal statistics presented earlier make us conﬁdent, however, that this will not affect the results qualita-
tively.
24Given the serial correlation present in the times series of the cost parameter, it is however more
natural to assume that prior beliefs change over time. Here, we would like to discuss part of the
observations we have on the gasoline retail market in Vienna from this perspective of adapting
prior beliefs.
Let us start with a motivating observation. Inspection of Figure 4 reveals that in mid-April
and mid-August 2007, the production cost of gasoline was at virtually the same level of slightly
below 1 Euro per litre but, at the same time, price distributions differed noticeably. The price
density estimates for April 20 and August 13 provided in Figure 6 further emphasize this ob-
servation: while the cost level on both dates was virtually identical at 97:7 Euro Cent per litre,
prices in August have been by approximately 10 Cent lower than in April. Can a consumer
search model be consistent with such a pricing behavior even if one takes the reasonable as-
sumption that the parameters s;N and l are roughly constant over time?
Figure 6: Price Density Estimates




















If the underlying parameters were really constant, the complete information model would
fail to explain the price distributions in Figure 6 as that model implies that price distributions
depend on the cost level alone. In the incomplete information model, however, the prior beliefs
of consumers about the production cost level are a further important determinant of prices.
Consequently, the incomplete information model may be consistent with Figure 6 also under
the assumption that s and l are constant parameters. In particular, it seems plausible that
priors are affected by the past evolution of production costs and that adjustment of prior beliefs
happens in a sluggish way. This implies that consumers tend to underestimate the cost level
in periods of increasing costs, whereas they overestimate it in periods of decreasing costs.
Recall further that by Proposition 3.5 ﬁrms will ﬁnd it optimal to set lower prices if consumers
underestimate the cost level as compared to a scenario where consumers have optimal prior
25beliefs. Taken together, these observations suggest that, even for the same level of current
marginal costs, prices should be lower in periods where costs have recently been increasing
compared to periods where costs have been stable (or even decreasing).
While the arguments in the previous two paragraphs have been rather casual, the remainder
of this section attempts to provide more formal evidence on the role of priors in shaping price
distributions. We estimate by OLS several linear models of the minimum, average and maxi-
mum price, respectively, and use in addition to the current marginal cost a further explanatory
variable reﬂecting whether costs have recently been increasing or decreasing. In particular, we
construct a variable BJ
t that aims to capture the effect of prior beliefs. It formalizes the idea
that prior beliefs in period t depend on the evolution of costs during the J days preceding date









to each regression equation. BJ
t gives the fraction of days during the period t ¡J;t ¡J+1;:::;t
where costs have increased from one day to the other. For example, a value of IJ
t = 0 im-
plies that costs have always been decreasing on a day-to-day basis for all J days before date t,
whereas IJ























The regression results for J = 14 are summarized in Table 2. Note that this particular value
for J has been selected because it delivers the highest explanatory power according to the R2
measure for the regression of the average price series, but we found our results to be qualita-
tively robust to different choices of J.
Our results show that the coefﬁcient on the variable BJ
t is signiﬁcant for all three equations.
Its estimated value is negative, which conﬁrms that prices are lower in periods where costs
had been increasing in the recent past.21 Interpreting BJ
t as a measure for the distortion in prior
20We have experimented with many other indicator variables, including past levels of the production cost, and
found our results to be very robust to different speciﬁcations.
21For example, the estimated coefﬁcient g14
B =¡0:0476 can be interpreted as follows: for the same level of mar-
ginal cost at time t, the average price for Euro-super 95 in a (hypothetical) scenario where costs have always been
increasing throughout the two weeks preceding datet would be 4:76 Euro Cent lower compared to a (hypothetical)
scenario where costs had always been decreasing throughout the two weeks preceding date t.
26Table 2: Regression results including B14
Coefﬁcient Point Est. 95% CI
b
14
0 0.0932 [ 0.0800, 0.1063]
b
14






0 0.1458 [ 0.1333, 0.1583]
g14






0 0.2569 [ 0.2437, 0.2702]
d
14
c 0.9585 [ 0.9457, 0.9714]
d
14
B -0.0672 [-0.0723,-0.0620 ]
R2 0.9609
beliefs, this result provides further empirical support for the relevance of distorted priors within
the incomplete information search framework.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a sequential consumer search model with incomplete (asymmet-
ric) information about the common underlying production cost of ﬁrms. We have characterized
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this model satisfying a reservation prices property. In this
equilibrium, ﬁrms sample prices from an optimal distribution and, in each search round, a con-
sumer buys if she observes a price below her current reservation price and searches for a better
deal otherwise. Unlike in the standard consumer search model, the reservation prices under
incomplete information are not stationary but differ across search rounds. This is due to con-
sumers updating their beliefs about the production cost level when observing prices. We have
further shown that an equilibrium with the properties just outlined exists for a relevant range
of parameter values (such as low search costs or markets with relatively many ﬁrms), but there
are cases where a reservation price equilibrium does not exist.
Comparing our environment to the complete information search model, we have shown that
both the average price and the expected lowest price in the market are higher, and consumer
27welfare is thus lower, under incomplete information. We have furthermore demonstrated that
the average proﬁt margin charged by ﬁrms and the extent of equilibrium price dispersion are
decreasing in the cost level, which is not the case in the complete information model. Moreover,
wehavehighlightedthattheconsumers’priorbeliefsabouttheproductioncostdistributionplay
an important role in shaping equilibrium price distributions.
Confronting our model with data from the retail gasoline market in Vienna (Austria), we
have ﬁnally investigated the empirical relevance of incomplete information. The evidence sug-
gests that gasoline retailers do follow a mixed strategy when setting prices. The evidence also
tells that (i) the extent of equilibrium price dispersion is decreasing in the level of production
cost, and (ii) the production cost level alone cannot determine the price distribution. Both
features point at the importance of incorporating incomplete information in consumer search
models.
There are several directions for future research. From a theoretical perspective, the present
paper does not answer the question which type of equilibria do exist in case a PBERP does not
exist. From a more applied perspective, the current paper could be extended to build a reason-
able dynamic model of the retail gasoline market, where consumers beliefs about retailers’ cost
are endogenously determined.
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30Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. If ﬁrms choose their prices according to a price distribution









Sincethere are N ﬁrms, each ﬁrmcan onlyexpecttoattract 1¡l
N non–shoppers, yieldingthe ﬁrst
part of equation (26). The second part of equation (26) expresses the idea that, if the other N¡1
ﬁrms choose their strategies according to Fk(pjc), the probability that ﬁrm i0s price is the lowest




Note that if a ﬁrm sets a price of ¯ pk(c) it does not attract any shoppers and will make a proﬁt
of 1¡l
N ( ¯ pk(c)¡c). Further, note that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, each ﬁrm must be indif-















( ¯ pk(c)¡c): (27)
Solving for Fk(pjc) yields equation (11) and taking
¶Fk(pjc)
¶ p = fk(pjc) yields equation (12).
Setting Fk(pjc) = 0 gives the lower bound pk(c) of the price distribution. As argued in the
main body of the paper, the upper bound ¯ pk(c) is equal to the reservation price rc. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3.1 Recall that the probability density function of the production cost c














Note that if y(c;p) is monotonically decreasing in c, then d(cjp) ﬁrst order stochastically dom-
inates g(c). In the following, we show that y(c;p) is indeed monotonically decreasing in c for
price observations in the interval [p(c); ¯ p]. To this end, note that for p 2 [p(c); ¯ p] the function



















































































































































Since d(cjp) is a density function for every p we have that
R ¯ c











dc = 0: (28)
This in turn implies that
¶d(cjp)
¶p can neither be positive nor negative for all values of c.
In particular, since d(cjp) is continuously differentiable, it follows that for all prices p 2























such that the above statement boils down to
f(p; ˆ c) = 0:
To prove the lemma, it basically remains to show that (i) there exists only one unique ˆ c that
satisﬁes f(p; ˆ c) = 0; and (ii) f(p;c) < 0 for c < ˆ c and f(p;c) > 0 for c > ˆ c. The last part is
due to the fact that ¶d(cjp)=¶p and f(p;c) have opposing signs.
Assume that there exist more than one values of ˆ c that satisfy f(p; ˆ c) = 0. In such a case, at
least one of these cost levels would have to satisfy
¶f(p;c)
¶c
jc=ˆ c · 0:












Consequently, there can only be a unique cost level ˆ c that satisﬁes f(p; ˆ c) = 0, and f(p;c) < 0






> 0 if c < ˆ c
= 0 if c = ˆ c
< 0 if c > ˆ c:
For p0 > p the posterior d(cjp0) puts more weight on low values of c and less weight on high
values of c as compared to d(cjp). Put differently, d(cjp) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates
d(cjp0). ¥
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Deﬁne r2(p) as the (hypothetical) price at which a consumer in round
two would be indifferent between buying at that price and continuing to search after having
observed p in the ﬁrst search round. There are two cases to consider: (i) r2(p) < r = p, and
(ii) r2(p) ¸ r1 = r = p. In the remainder of this proof, we argue that case (i) leads to an
inconsistency, while case (ii) leads to a consistent procedure with r being indeed deﬁned by
v¡r = v¡E(pjr)¡s:
CASE (i): Assume that r2(p) < r, and let us introduce for notational simplicity b p = r2(p).
Note that if a consumer observes b p in the ﬁrst search round, she would prefer to buy rather than
33continue to search. Formally, we have that v¡ b p¸ps(b p;N¡1), where we denote by ps(b p;N¡
1) the payoff of a consumer who has observed b p in the ﬁrst search round and continues to
search optimally given that there are potentially still N¡1 other ﬁrms to sample.
Next consider the hypothetical situation that there are in total N +1 ﬁrms in the market,
but all of these set their prices according to the equilibrium price distribution in the market
with N ﬁrms. Assume that a consumer has already observed two prices, b p and p: If this con-
sumer continues to search optimally after this hypothetical situation, her payoff is given by
ps(b p;p;N¡1): Furthermore, denote by ps(b p;p;N¡2) the payoff if the consumer continues to
search optimally after having observed b p and p and there are potentially only N¡2 other ﬁrms
to sample, as is true in our original market with N ﬁrms. Note further that, since r2(p)= b p<r,
we have that v¡ b p = ps(b p;p;N¡2):
At this stage, note that the beneﬁts of search as deﬁned above must satisfy
ps(b p;N¡1) > ps(b p;p;N¡1) ¸ ps(b p;p;N¡2):
The second inequality is obvious: a consumer can never get a higher payoff of searching if
she has the same price observations in her pocket and she has fewer search alternatives left.
Regarding the ﬁrst inequality, note that d(cjb p;p) is the posterior distribution which is obtained
by updating the belief d(cjb p) using the price observation ¯ p. As p > p(c) we can apply (a mod-
iﬁed version of) Lemma 3.1, taking d(cjb p) instead of g(c) as prior belief distribution, to obtain
that d(cjb p;p) FOSD d(cjb p). Hence, consumers become more pessimistic about the underlying
cost level having observed the price ¯ p. Further, recall that we have that F(pjc) FOSD F(pjc0)
whenever c>c0, such that consumers expect higher prices when they expect higher costs. Con-
sequently, it is strictly less attractive to continue searching after having observed both b p and p
compared to a situation where only b p had been observed. Thus, we arrive at an inconsistency,
because
v¡ b p ¸ ps(b p;N¡1) > ps(b p;p;N¡2) = v¡ b p:
CASE (ii): now assume that r2(p)¸r = p. A consumer who has observed the upper bound
r and continues to search will now buy in the next period at a price below r with probability
one. Thus, a consumer who has observed the upper bound ¯ p and continues to search optimally
will get a payoff of ps( ¯ p;N¡1) = v¡E(pjp)¡s. It follows that v¡r = v¡E(pjr)¡s. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.3. For a PBERP to exist, a consumer must necessarily ﬁnd it opti-
mal to buy if she observes a price lower than the reservation price r, and ﬁrms must not make
negative proﬁts when choosing prices from the PBERP price distribution. In the following, we
provide restrictions on the model’s parameters such that these two conditions are satisﬁed. To
34this end, we proceed in two steps. In Part 1, we ﬁrst show that at prices p with p(c) < p < r
an uninformed consumer prefers to buy instead of continuing to search and buy necessarily
in the next round. Later on, we allow for more general search behaviors. In Part 2, we pro-
vide conditions such that a consumer also ﬁnds it optimal to buy when she observes a price in
[p(c);p(c)]. Finally, we show that these conditions already guarantee that ﬁrms make positive
proﬁts in equilibrium.
PART 1: Consider for the time being the following hypothetical scenario. A consumer
observes the price p0 and must decide between buying at p0 immediately and visiting one more
ﬁrm, provided that she must necessarily buy after having obtained this additional price quote.
In such a situation, the consumer is indifferent between buying and searching if she observes
the reservation price, i.e. if p0 = r, as this price equates her net beneﬁts of search to zero. Now
assume that the consumer has observed a lower price p0 in (p(c);r). By Lemma 3.2, she is
now more pessimistic about the cost and thus the possibility of ﬁnding lower prices compared
to if she had observed r. Consequently, she must ﬁnd it optimal to buy rather than search one
more ﬁrm.
So far, we have argued that for prices p such that p(c) < p < r, the uninformed consumer
prefers to buy instead of continuing to search and buy necessarily in the next round. We now
consider more general search behaviors. In particular, it may easily be the case that the con-
sumer, after continuing to search, may not want to buy after observing the next price, but
instead prefers to continue searching at least one more time. We will now show that this cannot
be optimal either if consumers observe prices p with p(c) < p · r:
If a consumer has observed t prices with p0 = min(p1;::;pt) ¸ p(c); then her payoff from







c F(p0jc)d(cjp1;::;pt)dc is the subjective probability of ﬁnding a






In this sense, d(cjp1;::;pt) is the distribution obtained from updating d(cjp1;::;pt¡1) after
the price observation pt. We can again apply (a modiﬁed version of) Lemma 3.1, taking
d(cjp1;::;pt¡1)insteadofg(c)aspriordistribution, toobtainthatif pt ¸ p(c), thend(cjp1;::;pt)
ﬁrstorderstochasticallydominatesd(cjp1;::;pt¡1):Byinduction, d(cjp1;::;pt)FOSDd(cjp0):













wherethelastinequalityfollowsfromthefactthatE(pjp< p0;c)< p0 andthatF(p0jp1;::;pt)<
F(p0): Thus, as




it follows that if p0 = min(p1;::;pt) ¸ p(c)




Consequently, the consumer does not want to continue searching and then buy immediately in
the next round after having observed t prices with p(c) · p0 = min(p1;::;pt) · r for any t:
Let us ﬁnally consider the following, alternative search strategy: the consumer decides to
continue searching in round t and, after having observed one more price, does not buy at any of
the prices observed up to that moment if the newly observed price is larger than p(c): It is easy
to see that, if the consumer searches in this way and then buys at a later moment, her payoff




E(pjp < e p;c)d(cjp1;::;pt+1)dc¡(1¡F(e pjp1;::;pt+1))e p
for some e p ¸ p(c): Using the argument given above, it follows that this is not optimal as well.
By induction, it follows that it is also not optimal to wait more than one period. Taken together,
the arguments we have used so far show that a consumer will indeed buy if she observes a price
in the interval (p(c);r).
PART 2: Let us now consider consumer behavior if a price below p(c) is observed. By
assumption, we have p(c) · rk(c), so that all these prices are below the reservation price in
a model where (i) the consumers are informed about the cost realization and (ii) know this
realization is equal to c. We will argue that consumers should always buy at such prices.
As we consider prices p0 · rk(c), it easily follows that
v¡ p0 ¸ v¡rk(c) = v¡s¡Ek(pjc)





36Thus, the consumer prefers to buy at prices p0 · rk(c) instead of continuing to search and
buy then immediately. Furthermore, arguments similar to the ones used in Part 1 of this proof
can be applied to establish that it does neither pay off to continue searching and then not to
buy immediately after observing some price. Thus, under our assumption p(c) · rk(c), a
reservation price strategy is optimal for the consumer.
To complete the existence part of the proof, we need to rewrite the condition p(c) · rk(c)
in terms of the model’s exogenous parameters and examine the proﬁts made by ﬁrms given the



































Tocheckthatﬁrms’proﬁtsarepositive, itissufﬁcienttocheckthatforallc; p(c)>c:As p(c)=
lN
lN+1¡lc+ 1¡l
lN+1¡l ¯ p; this is the case if ¯ p > c: As ¯ p = s
1¡a +
R ¯ c
c cd(cj ¯ p)dc ¸ s
1¡a +c: This





. Uniqueness of the equilibrium








To show that this equation has a unique solution, we show that the RHS is decreasing in p,
which together with the fact that the LHS is increasing in p, sufﬁces. For this purpose, we have












































¶p > 0 for some e c it is positive for all c > e c: Moreover, since d(cjp) is a
density function we have
R ¯ c










dc = 0: (30)






> 0 if c < ˆ c
= 0 if c = ˆ c
< 0 if c > ˆ c:
Thus, the posterior d(cjp) puts relatively more weight on low values of c the larger the values
p: Thus, the RHS is decreasing in p: ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.4. In a reservation price equilibrium, there is some r0 such that
consumers buy in the ﬁrst round of search if, and only if, p · r0: It is clear that r0 ¸ rk(c) as
otherwise consumers will buy even if they observe a price (slightly) above r0: Also, r0 · r:
This latter claim follows from the following observations. First, for all p · rk(c); v¡ p <
v¡s¡E(pjp), i.e., if the upper bound of the price distribution is relatively low consumers
would prefer to buy at the upper bound rather than continuing to search. Second, for all p ¸
rk(c); v¡ p > v¡s¡E(pjp), i.e., if the upper bound of the price distribution is relatively high
consumers would prefer to continuing to search if they observe a price equal to the upper bound
rather than buy. Third, r is uniquely deﬁned by v¡r = v¡s¡E(pjr): Thus, for all r0 > r;
v¡r >v¡s¡E(pjr);i.e., consumerprefertobuyimmediatelyinsteadofcontinuingtosearch.
Thus, it follows that the upper bound of the price distribution ¯ p = r0 and rk(c) · ¯ p · r:
Let us then consider the proﬁts of ﬁrms. In an equilibrium it has to be the case that
these proﬁts are positive for all c. This is the case if, and only if, for all c; p(c) > c: As
p(c) = lN
lN+1¡lc+ 1¡l
lN+1¡l ¯ p; this is the case if, and only if, ¯ p > c: A reservation price equilib-
rium therefore does not exist if ¯ p= s
1¡a +
R ¯ c
c cd(cj ¯ p)dc<c: This is the case if (i) s is relatively
small enough or (ii) c and c are relatively far apart and g(c) has a relatively high probability
mass close to c: ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Let the reservation price of consumers with ˆ g(c) be denoted by
ˆ r. We denote by E(p; ˆ g) the ex-ante expected price of a consumer with prior ˆ g. As above, E(p)
refers to the ex-ante expected price of a consumer who holds the optimal prior g(c). Note that
the ﬁrms’ pricing behavior is again characterized by Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.1, with the
upper bound of the price distribution being ˆ r. Let ˆ d(cjˆ r) denote the posterior distribution of
38the cost conditional upon having observed ˆ r,










We need to show that E(p; ˆ g) > E(p). Note that, by equations (16) and (19), this is equiv-
alent to ˆ r > r. In the following, we prove that this latter inequality indeed must always hold
if h is an increasing function. In particular, we argue that the assumption ˆ r · r is internally
inconsistent.





















































c ˆ g(c0) N¡1
q
1




ˆ r¡c is (weakly) increasing in c, and therefore
ˆ d(cjˆ r)
d(cjr) would be strictly increasing in c since
hisbyassumptionstrictly increasingin c. Consequently, if ˆ r ·r, then ˆ d(cjˆ r)wouldﬁrstorder
stochastically dominate d(cjr). This, in turn, would imply that
R ¯ c
c cˆ d(cjˆ r)dc >
R ¯ c
c cd(cjr)dc
and by equation (16), that ˆ r > r, which obviously is inconsistent with the initial assumption
that ˆ r · r. Consequently, when h is an increasing c, it must be true that ˆ r > r and therefore
that E(p; ˆ g) > E(p). The same arguments can be used to show that E(p; ˆ g) < E(p) when h is
strictly decreasing in c.
Note that in a mixed strategy equilibrium all prices in the support of the equilibrium price
distribution have to yield the same proﬁts as the proﬁts made when charging the upper bound.
It follows that expected proﬁts are higher/lower if consumers overestimate/underestimate the
cost distribution compared to the scenario when the prior distribution is optimal. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.1. By equations (9), (10), (19), and (20) it is obvious that both





3.1, d(cj ¯ p) FOSD g(c), such that E(cj ¯ p)>E(c) obtains trivially. As the expected price of each
consumertypeishigherunderincompleteinformation, expectedproﬁtsarehigherandthuspro-
ducer welfare is higher. Furthermore, as consumer welfare is inversely related to the expected
39price, we have that consumer welfare of both shoppers and non-shoppers is lower under incom-
plete information. ¥
ProofofProposition4.2. Underincompleteinformation, eachﬁrm’sconditionallyexpected
















To see this, note that in a mixed strategy equilibrium each ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt must be equal
to the proﬁt resulting from charging the upper bound of the price distribution. Obviously,



















establishing that conditional expected proﬁts under incomplete information are higher for low
cost realizations, and lower for high cost realizations, compared to conditional expected proﬁts
under complete information. ¥
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